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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Lena Kaye Page appeals from her conviction for possession of methamphetamine.
She challenges the denial of her motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
While on routine patrol in a very rural area, a few minutes before midnight, Trooper
Wade saw a car driving slowly, partly on and partly off the road, which then came to a
complete stop. (R., pp. 24, 178.) Trooper Wade and an assisting trooper made contact
with the occupants of the vehicle, which was driven by Page and had one passenger. (R.,
pp. 24, 178.) Wade was “fidgety and very nervous” and appeared to be trying to hide
something from officers as she would “often put her hands inside of her pocket.” (R., pp.
25, 178-79.) Based on that and a bulge in the pocket, the assisting trooper conducted a patdown and found a lighter and a “small bag” that contained traces of what appeared to be
methamphetamine. (R., pp. 25, 179.) When Trooper Wade attempted to perform field
sobriety tests on Page, she became violent. (R., p. 25.) Concluding that Page was driving
under the influence, Trooper Wade arrested her for DUI. (R., pp. 25, 179.) A search of
her car for evidence of drug use related to the DUI uncovered a methamphetamine pipe.
(R., p. 25.) Preliminary testing on the bag recovered during the pat-down was positive for
methamphetamine. (R., p. 25.)
The state charged Page in this case with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.
86-87.) Page moved to suppress “any all [sic] evidence seized during the search of the
Defendant on the grounds and for the reasons that there was a seizure and search of the
Defendant in violation of the Defendant’s rights against unreasonable searches and
1

seizures.” (R., p. 96. ----See also R., pp. 104-05, 115-16, 137-61.) The state argued that the
contact with Page started voluntarily, but that the officers thereafter conducted a weapons
frisk because of concerns that Page was armed and dangerous. (R., pp. 162-67.)
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 177-84.) It concluded
that any detention that preceded the frisk was justified by the community caretaking
function. (R., pp. 179-81.) It also concluded the detention associated with the frisk and
the frisk itself were justified by reasonable suspicion Page could have been armed and
dangerous. (R., pp. 181-84.)
The parties entered a plea agreement and Page pled guilty conditionally, preserving
her right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion. (R., pp. 189-96; Tr., p. 75, Ls. 112.) As part of the plea agreement, the state stipulated that Page be released on her own
recognizance. (Tr., p. 75, L. 13 – p. 76, L. 6.) Page absconded before sentencing. (R., p.
205.) Twice. (R., p. 228.) Prompting the district court to order she be held without bail
for the sentencing hearing. (R., pp. 229-30.) At sentencing the district court held that Page
had violated the plea agreement by absconding before sentencing. (Tr., p. 104, Ls. 8-17.)
The district court imposed a sentence of four years with one year determinate,
which it suspended and placed Page on probation. (R., pp. 241-46.) Page filed a notice of
appeal timely from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 252-54.)
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ISSUES
Page states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Page’s motion to
suppress since the video of the encounter shows the troopers
temporarily abandoned the mission of the welfare check for two
minutes, thereby unlawfully prolonging the warrantless detention.

II.

Whether the district court erred by failing to address Ms. Page’s
motion to suppress the unwarned statements she made during the
encounter.

III.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by not redlining
objected-to portions of the PSI that section [sic] even though the
district court indicated it would not consider those facts because they
were not reliable.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Should this Court decline to address the challenge to the denial of the suppression
motion because Page forfeited the conditional nature of her guilty plea when she
breached the plea agreement by absconding?

2.

If the state’s agreement to a conditional guilty plea survives Page’s breach of the
plea, has Page failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress?

3.

Should this Court decline to address Page’s claim there was a Miranda violation,
raised for the first time on appeal?

4.

Has Page failed to show that the district court had a duty to “redline” objected-to
portions of the PSI?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Page Forfeited The Conditional Nature Of Her Guilty Plea When She Breached The Plea
Agreement By Absconding
Page absconded from her own-recognizance release (obtained as a condition of the
plea agreement), thus breaching the plea agreement and relieving the state of its obligations
under the plea agreement. (Tr., p. 104, Ls. 8-17.) One of the state’s obligations under the
plea agreement was to consent to a conditional plea. (Tr., p. 75, Ls. 1-12.) Because Page
breached the plea agreement, she is no longer entitled to the state’s consent to pursue this
appeal, which should therefore be dismissed.
“Plea agreements are essentially bilateral contracts between the prosecutor and the
defendant.” State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521, 524, 300 P.3d 53, 56 (2013). The language of
a plea agreement is “given its ordinary and well-understood meaning.” State v. Gomez,
153 Idaho 253, 257, 281 P.3d 90, 94 (2012). That a defendant will appear at the sentencing
hearing to receive the benefit of the plea agreement is “implicit in the agreement.” Berg v.
State, 131 Idaho 517, 519, 960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998). “In essence, part of pleading guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement, is receiving the benefits of the agreement at sentencing for
the crime to which the defendant has admitted guilt.” State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74, 106
P.3d 397, 400 (2005). Thus, “failing to attend sentencing constitutes a breach of the plea
agreement by the defendant.” Id. “The prosecution is not obligated to perform a plea
agreement if the condition upon which the prosecution’s promised sentencing
recommendation was based fails.” Id. (internal quotes and ellipse omitted).
Among the benefits Page secured from the state in the plea agreement were that the
state would consent to a conditional plea, stipulate to a release on her own recognizance,
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and make a specific sentencing recommendation. (R., pp. 189-96; Tr., p. 75, Ls. 1-12.)
After being released on her own recognizance pursuant to the agreement, Page absconded
before sentencing. (R., pp. 205, 228.) By doing so, Page violated the plea agreement,
releasing the state from its obligations. (Tr., p. 104, Ls. 8-17.) Because Page secured the
state’s consent to the conditional plea through an unfulfilled promise, that consent is no
longer valid. Page’s guilty plea was rendered unconditional by her failure to fulfill her part
of the agreement, and therefore does not preserve an appellate challenge to the denial of
the motion to suppress. This Court should decline to hear unpreserved appellate claims
challenging the denial of the motion to suppress because Page breached the plea agreement.

II.
Page Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
If the challenge to the denial of the motion to suppress is allowed to proceed, Page

has failed to show error. The district court determined three things. First, that “Trooper
Wade acted under his community caretaking function when he detained the Defendant.”
(R., pp. 179-81 (bolding omitted).) Second, that “the extended detention of the Defendant
was justified in view of the additional objective and articulable facts observed by Troopers
Wade and Fortner.” (R., pp. 181-83 (bolding omitted, capitalization altered).) Third, that
“Trooper Fortner had specific and articulable facts that led him to believe the Defendant
was armed and dangerous.” (R., pp. 183-84 (bolding omitted).) On appeal Page challenges
only the first of these determinations. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-17.) Specifically, Page
argues the troopers deviated from their community caretaking function when they “did not
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immediately address the mission of the welfare check” and spent “the first two minutes of
the encounter … trying to detect potential criminal violations.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)
Page has failed to show error by the district court. The trooper’s efforts to identify
the persons in the car and to understand why Page had stopped in an isolated location, half
off and half on the roadway, were not outside the scope of the encounter. Alternatively,
there was no initial detention under the Fourth Amendment because the encounter was
voluntary at its inception.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress using a bifurcated

standard. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607, 389 P.3d 150, 152 (2016) (citing State v.
Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). The appellate court will accept
the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Purdum, 147
Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183). However the appellate court freely reviews the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found. Id. (citing Purdum, 147
Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183).

C.

Page’s Fourth Amendment Rights Were Not Violated When Officers Contacted
Her To Learn Why She Had Driven Off The Road And Stopped Her Car, Half On
The Road Half Off, In The Middle Of The Night In An Secluded Location
“The community caretaking function involves the duty of police officers to help

individuals an officer believes may be in need of assistance.” State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho
442, 444, 34 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Ct. App. 2001). “A detention is constitutionally permissible
if it is reasonably conducted in furtherance of the government agent’s community
caretaking function.” State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App.
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2002). “In order for the community caretaking function analysis to apply, an officer must
possess a subjective belief that an individual is in need of immediate assistance, although
the officer may harbor at least an expectation of detecting or finding evidence of a crime.”
State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 304, 47 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ct. App. 2002).
“Reasonableness in community caretaking cases is determined by balancing the public
need and interest furthered by the police conduct against the degree and nature of the
intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen.” State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302, 141 P.3d
1166, 1171 (Ct. App. 2006). “The reasonableness of an officer’s action in pursuit of
community caretaking is to be tested upon practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable persons act.” Id. It is reasonable for an officer to require identification
during the course of community caretaking. State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 494-96, 826
P.2d 452, 455-57 (1992).
In State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 693, 991 P.2d 878, 881 (Ct. App. 1999), an
officer’s limited detention of a motorist was justified under the community caretaking
function where the motorist “abruptly pull[ed] over to the shoulder of the road and
stop[ped] partly in the traffic lane.” In the present case Page’s maneuver was less abrupt,
but no less indicative of a problem. The district court properly concluded that any detention
in this case prior to the frisk was appropriate under the community caretaking function.
Page argues that the community caretaking function does not apply because
Trooper Wade asked what Page “‘was up to,’” mentioned that her actions “‘seemed a little
suspicious,’” asked about her relationship with the passenger, asked if she and her
passenger had been drinking, asked about weapons, and asked why she was wearing a
glove. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.) These actions, she contends, show that the officers
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were engaged in a criminal investigation, not community caretaking. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 13-17.) This argument does not withstand analysis.
The primary flaw in Page’s argument is that it improperly attempts to restrict the
scope of the community caretaking function. Page assumes that the community caretaking
function was limited to inquiring whether Page needed assistance with her car. The police,
however, are not AAA. In this case community caretaking included ascertaining why Page
pulled over (whether it was mechanical failure, whether she had run out of gas, or whether
there was some other issue in play such as a medical emergency, domestic violence, or
even intoxication), whether Page needed assistance for whatever had caused her to pull
over, and how to address the obvious traffic hazard her car represented being parked partly
on the roadway. Trooper Wade’s questions were reasonably related to these community
caretaking concerns. Even if there were a detention, the district court correctly concluded
that it was justified by the community caretaking function until the frisk (which Page has
not challenged on appeal).
Alternatively, there was no detention. “An encounter between a law enforcement
officer and a citizen does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is
nonconsensual.” State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009)
(citations omitted). To constitute a seizure, the officer must, “by means of physical force
or show of authority,” in some way restrain an individual’s liberty. Id. This “requires
words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement officer that would convey to a reasonable
person that the officer was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement.” Id.
(citations omitted). “[A] request for identification or mere questioning is not enough, by
itself[,] to constitute a seizure.” State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230
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(2004) (citations omitted). “This is so because the person approached need not answer any
question put to him and may decline to listen to the questions at all and go about his
business.” State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523-524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485 (Ct. App.
1991) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-498 (1983)). “Thus, where an officer
merely approaches a person who is standing on the street, or seated in a non-moving vehicle
located in a public place, and poses a few questions, no seizure has occurred.” Id. (citation
omitted). The relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “a
reasonable person would feel free to disregard the law enforcement officer”; if so, “then
the encounter is consensual.” Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486, 211 P.3d at 95.
In this case it is uncontroverted that Page stopped at the side of the road on her own,
without any traffic stop. Trooper Wade stopped his car, but did not activate lights to signal
a detention. He then asked several questions related to Page and her passenger’s identity,
connection to each other, her reason for stopping, and if she needed assistance with her car.
Under the totality of circumstances, the officers did not employ physical force or make a
show of authority that suggested Page was not free to go. To the contrary, it was her car’s
apparent inability to proceed that constituted the reason she did not leave.
On appeal Page asserts there was a detention. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-12.) She
first speculates that there were oral commands. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.) The only
evidence of such commands were her alleged reactions to the commands. (Id.) The district
court did not find that the officers issued any commands, none are shown by the evidence,
and Page’s base speculation that such commands were uttered does not show a detention.
Page next argues that because Trooper Fortner moved the conversation from the
roadway to the shoulder she was detained. (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) This reasonable
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safety precaution would not convey to a reasonable person that she was being detained.
Rather, it would convey to a reasonable person that standing on a roadway to hold a
conversation may not be safe.
The facts of this case show there was no detention until the frisk, the reasonableness
of which Page does not separately challenge on appeal. Under either theory, community
caretaking or that there was no detention, Page’s Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated when officers stopped to determine why Page had driven off the road and stopped
her car, half on the road and half off, in the middle of the night in an secluded location. 1

III.
This Court Should Decline To Address Page’s Claim There Was A Miranda Violation,
Raised For The First Time On Appeal
Page claims there was a Miranda 2 violation that requires this Court to remand this
case so that the issue may be addressed. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.) Page made no
claim of a Miranda violation below, but rather based her motion to suppress exclusively
upon the Fourth Amendment. (See R., pp. 137-61.) Page’s request that this Court remand
the case so that she may make a motion she did not make prior to the appeal is frivolous.
“A valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior
proceedings.” Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 832, 452 P.2d 54, 59 (1969). See also

1

The state also submits that Page’s maneuver of pulling to the side of the road leaving her
vehicle half in the lane of travel created reasonable suspicion of a traffic infraction because
it was “not within the range of normal driving behavior.” State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205,
209, 953 P.2d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1998). See also State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483,
988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.App.1999).
2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10

Blackburn v. State, 161 Idaho 769, 773, 391 P.3d 654, 658 (Ct. App. 2017) (“Ordinarily, a
plea of guilty, if voluntarily and knowingly made, is conclusive as to the defendant’s guilt
and waives all nonjurisdictional defects in prior proceedings against the defendant.”).
Nothing in the record suggests the state agreed to an appeal of the district court’s alleged
failure to rule on an unraised Miranda claim. This issue was therefore necessarily waived
by the guilty plea.

IV.
Page Has Failed To Show That The District Court Had A Duty To “Redline” ObjectedTo Portions Of The PSI
The PSI states, as the official version of the crime, that during the encounter with
the troopers, Page “kept reaching in her pockets, and was acting fidgety and nervous.”
(PSI, p. 5. 3) Page objected to this statement, asserting that it was contradicted by the video
of the encounter. (Tr., p. 92, L. 21 – p. 93, L. 9.) In response to the objection, the trial
court stated: “Right. I understand. And, Ms. Page, it’s just the police report. The police
report is the police report. I watched the video. Just like Mr. Reynolds said, I know what
happened; okay?” (Tr., p. 93, Ls. 10-14.)
On appeal Page claims the district court erred by not “redlining” the statement
because she feels it may adversely affect her in the future. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-21.)
This argument fails because it is unpreserved and without legal merit. Page requested the
district court to consider additional evidence regarding her demeanor in the encounter with
police, and the district court did so. Page did not request, nor was she so entitled, to have
the conflicting evidence stricken.

3

Page numbers in the citations to the PSI are to the electronic file of the confidential
exhibits.
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A sentencing court “may consider hearsay evidence, evidence of previously
dismissed charges against the defendant, or evidence of charges which have not yet been
proved, so long as the defendant has the opportunity to object to, or to rebut, the evidence
of his alleged misconduct.” State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 926, 854 P.2d 265, 269 (Ct.
App. 1993). “The latitude of the district court in admitting various types of evidence is far
greater in sentencing than at trial.” Fodge v. State, 125 Idaho 882, 885, 876 P.2d 164, 167
(Ct. App. 1994). It is error to consider sentencing evidence only if “there is no reasonable
basis to deem it reliable, as where the information is simply conjecture or speculation.”
Campbell, 123 Idaho at 926, 854 P.2d at 269. “On appeal, we presume that a sentencing
court is able to ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and
material which is presented to it during the sentencing process, to disregard the irrelevant
and unreliable evidence, and to properly weigh the remaining evidence which may be in
conflict.” Id.
Page did not ask the district court to strike anything from the PSI. Rather, Page
merely rebutted the evidence therein (the statements of the police report) with additional
evidence (the video of the encounter). The district court assured her that it would consider
its own factual findings regarding her nervousness and putting her hands in her pockets. 4
Page did not claim, and the district court did not find, that the police report was “unreliable”
evidence, only that different evidence showed that a different conclusion should be reached
regarding fidgeting and placing the hand in the pocket.

4

The district court’s factual findings were more consistent with the police report/PSI than
with Page’s claims. (See R., pp 181-83.)
12

Page relies on State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 231 P.3d 1047 (Ct. App. 2010).
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.) In that case Molen “moved to strike” a report from Utah in
his PSI that someone with the same name, but a different birth date, had a confirmed
instance of sexual abuse of a child. 148 Idaho at 961, 231 P.3d at 1058. The district court
“agreed to disregard” the information at sentencing, but refused to strike it from the PSI.
Id. The Court of Appeals found error, concluding that “the unreliable information should
have been stricken from the PSI to prevent future prejudice to Molen.” Id. at 962, 231 P.3d
at 1059. Unlike in Molen, the claim here is not that the trooper’s statements are unreliable
as evidence. Rather, Page’s claim below was only that the statements conflict with other
evidence and different factual conclusions should therefore be drawn from the conflicting
evidence. Molen stands for the proposition that evidence so unreliable that it cannot be
relied on at all should be stricken, not that evidence that conflicts with other evidence
should be stricken.
Page only pointed out that there was conflicting evidence. She never claimed, much
less showed, that the trooper’s statements were unreliable in the sense that they should be
ignored in their entirety and not considered at all. Moreover, there is no basis for striking
evidence in a PSI merely because the Defendant disputes it and has presented conflicting
evidence. Finally, striking evidence that Page was nervous and stuck her hand in her pocket
repeatedly, even if not accurately capturing her exact actions that night, is not required to
“prevent future prejudice” to Page. In short, Page has failed to show how this case bears
even passing resemblance to Molen, much less how Molen controls the outcome of this
claim.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 29th day of May, 2019.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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